@leopoldasch / appears on dwarkesh, dwarkesh, dwarkesh, dwarkesh, dwarkesh, dwarkesh, dwarkesh, dwarkesh, dwarkesh, dwarkesh, dwarkesh, dwarkesh, dwarkesh, dwarkesh, dwarkesh, dwarkesh, dwarkesh, dwarkesh, dwarkesh, dwarkesh, dwarkesh, dwarkesh, dwarkesh, dwarkesh, dwarkesh, dwarkesh, dwarkesh, dwarkesh, dwarkesh, dwarkesh, dwarkesh, dwarkesh, dwarkesh, dwarkesh, dwarkesh, dwarkesh, dwarkesh, dwarkesh, dwarkesh, dwarkesh
No settled calls yet — credibility updates as call horizons resolve.
Now it's broadening. Now TSMC is 20% AI by 2027 or something is what they're saying. One more doubling, it'll be kind of like a large fraction of what they're doing.
a lot of people have sort of made these climate commitments. They're not just government, it's actually the private companies themselves, right? The Microsofts, the Amazons, and so on. They have these climate commitments, so they won't do natural gas.
At some point, actually, I think there's going to be a real tailwind to equities from real interest rates. Basically, in these explosive growth worlds, you would expect real interest rates to go up a lot, both on the demand for money side because people are going to be making these crazy investments initially in clusters and then in the robo-factories
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}AISO Market Calls classifies public statements from public sources. A classification such as long thesis, short thesis, or explicit call describes the content of the public statement and does not prove that the speaker actually entered, exited, or held a position. Market performance shown is calculated from public market data around the source publication or timestamp. It is not investment advice.
within weeks, you know, Congress spent over 10% of GDP on like COVID measures, right? The entire country was shut down.
Nvidia data center revenue has gone from like, you know, a few billion a quarter to like, you know, $20, $25 billion a quarter now. And, you know, continuing to go up, like, you know, big tech CapEx is skyrocketing.
They're able to make 7-nanometer chips now. I think there's a question of how many could they make, but I think there's at least a possibility that they're going to be able to mature that ability and make a lot of 7-nanometer chips. There's a lot of latent industrial capacity in China and they are able to build a lot of power fast.
I think this is where it gets really interesting for the big tech companies because their revenues are on order hundreds of billions. So it's like $10 billion, fine... but really, when big tech will be gangbusters, it's $100 billion a year.
And then 2030, trillion-dollar cluster, 100 gigawatts, over 20% of US electricity production
At some point, a Google or something becomes interesting... At some point, Google will get $100 billion of revenue from AI. Probably their stock will explode. They're going to become a $5 trillion, $10 trillion company.
And there's a whole stack. There's people making memory and co-was and power.
I mean, in the Taiwan watcher circles, people often talk about the late 2020s as the maximum period of risk for Taiwan. Taiwan because military modernization cycles and extreme fiscal tightening on the military budget in the United States over the last decade or two has meant that we're in this trough in the late '20s of overall naval capacity. And that's when China is saying they want to be ready.
I think people are just vastly underrating the chances of this more or less looking like a government project.
No reach data yet.
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